Children hold strong ingroup biases from a young age, liking ingroup over outgroup members and preferring them as social learning models. Simultaneously, children are also highly prosocial-both in their own helping behaviors and their avoidance of those who behave antisocially. This study explores how children of 2 age groups (4 -5 and 7-8 years) react when these biases conflict; that is, when children's ingroup behaves antisocially. Children were assigned to a group and given a premeasure of liking to assess ingroup bias. They were then shown videos of the ingroup behaving antisocially and the outgroup behaving prosocially (or neutral controls). Children were then given the opportunity to choose which group to imitate and whether they wanted to change groups and then again given a measure of liking. Results revealed that older children were highly sensitive to pro-and antisocial behavior; when their ingroup was antisocial they were less likely to imitate them, reported liking them less, and were more likely to want to change groups. In contrast, younger children imitated the ingroup and reported liking them more regardless of their behavior and actually reported wanting to change groups less when their group was antisocial. This demonstrates a clear developmental jump between younger and older children in their capacity to weigh multiple strands of information when making decisions, and in particular it highlights the emergence of strong prosocial concern that persists over a drive to affiliate with an ingroup.
To become active and valued members of their ingroup, children must learn appropriate norms of behavior and the culturally specific ways of using and interacting with the multifarious objects and artifacts that surround them. Although there are many avenues of learning available to them, one of the more effective and powerful is imitation: reproducing the means, goals or intentions, and outcomes of another's actions (Want & Harris, 2002) . There is now a vast, yet ever-growing corpus of literature documenting children's pervasive imitative proclivities, literature that underpins claims humans have a unique inclination for precise copying of others that set us on a geneϪculture coevolutionary path distinct from all other species (Boyd & Richerson, 1996; Henrich & McElreath, 2003; Legare & Nielsen, 2015; Nielsen, 2012 Nielsen, , 2018 Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993) . But what happens when those whom children learn from act in ways that violate acceptable standards, that is, behave in an antisocial way? The aim of the current research was to answer this question.
From early infancy, humans acquire the skills needed to use novel objects by watching and copying what others do with them (Barr, Dowden, & Hayne, 1996; Meltzoff, 1988) . By 2 years of age, children show a proclivity to copy others so inclusively that they will incorporate visibly, causally irrelevant actions (e.g., Kenward, 2012; Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007; McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & Horner, 2007; Nielsen, 2006) . Critically, this proclivity for high-fidelity copying is not a derivative of children's blindly replicating everything shown to them but is rather part of a process in which decisions are made based on a range of different dimensions regarding what to copy, whom to copy, and when to copy (Koenig & Sabbagh, 2013 ). Children's proclivity for imitation becomes increasingly socially motivated from the preschool years (Over & Carpenter, 2012) , and they will prefer models who are culturally typical, as demonstrated by physical cues or support from other established ingroup members (Kinzler, Corriveau, & Harris, 2011) . Children prefer to imitate ingroup over outgroup members (Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum, & Carpenter, 2013; Howard, Henderson, Carrazza, & Woodward, 2015 , but see Gruber, Deschenaux, Frick, & Clément, 2017) and will even actively contrast their behavior with that of outgroups (Oostenbroek & Over, 2015) .
Children's social motivations to imitate are not, however, allencompassing. For example, children will prioritize copying successful outgroup individuals over unsuccessful ingroup members (Wilks, Collier-Baker, & Nielsen, 2015) . This is contextualized, though, by functional failure by the ingroup and absence of social pressure to conform. Indeed, there is a complex interplay between evaluating others' pro-or antisocial behavior and inherent ingroup biases Hetherington, Hendrickson, & Koenig, 2014; . Of relevance to the current study, children's imitative responses are diminished when the consequent actions cause destruction of another's property (Keupp, Bancken, Schillmöller, Rakoczy, & Behne, 2016) , though notably, this study did not manipulate ingroup affiliation. Hetherington et al. (2014) found that immoral ingroup behavior reduced children's ingroup liking (but see Schug, Shusterman, Barth, & Patalano, 2013) but that desire to learn from the ingroup persisted even when the ingroup behaved immorally. This study did not test for imitation. What remains unknown is the extent of children's willingness to imitate the antisocial behavior of their ingroup.
In the main experimental manipulation of the current study we presented children with videos in which ingroup members, manipulated via a minimal group paradigm, engaged in antisocial behavior and outgroup members performed contrasting prosocial actions. We measured children's willingness to imitate the actions demonstrated to them, as well as their general social perceptions of each group. This allowed us to explore the interplay between two competing, and pervasive, social preferences: ingroup bias (Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011; Sherif, 1961) and prosocial concern (Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom, & Mahajan, 2011; McAuliffe, Blake, Steinbeis, & Warneken, 2017; Warneken, 2016) . Previous research has shown that children are less likely to imitate actions that cause damage to others (Keupp et al., 2016) and report liking antisocial ingroup members less (Hetherington et al., 2014) . In the following study, we predicted that children who saw their ingroup behaving antisocially would be less willing to imitate them, would report liking them less, and would have a stronger desire to swap into an alternative group compared to when the videos were stripped of moral detail. Moreover, to trace possible developmental trajectories, we included children ages 4 -5 and 7-8 years. These two age groups were chosen because past research has documented developmental changes in children's tendency to consider others when making sociomoral judgments (Cooley & Killen, 2015; Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, 2011) , greater adherence to prosocial norms (Smith, Blake, & Harris, 2013) , and greater willingness to incur personal cost to rectify prosocial violations (McAuliffe, Jordan, & Warneken, 2015; Robbins & Rochat, 2011) . Moreover, recent research has suggested that as children age, they have greater capacity to consider both group biases and prosocial concern when making judgments about the intersection of the two (see Rutland & Killen, 2015 . In line with this, we predicted that when exposed to antisocial ingroup members, older, but not younger, children would be less likely to imitate their ingroup and would show a greater reduction in ingroup liking and a higher desire to change groups, compared to when the ingroup behaved neutrally.
Method Participants
This project, The Sociocultural Factors That Contribute to Moral Development, was given approval by the School of Psychology Ethics Review Committee within the University of Queensland (Approval No. 15-PSYCH-PHD-52-JH). A total of 164 children agreed to participate. Of these 37% identified as Australian, 26% as Northwest European, 6% Southeast Asian, 1% Northeast Asian, 2% mixed race, and 28% chose not to report ethnicity. Of those who reported being mixed race, 1% were Southeast Asian and People of the Americas, 1% Northwest Asian and People of the Americas, and 1% North African and Middle Eastern. Nineteen children did not participate due to logistical demands (changing their mind, upset sibling, rushed parent). Ultimately, a total of 145 children participated in the experiment. Thirty-one were excluded after testing (13 for failing manipulation checks, 10 for being outside of the focus age range, five due to experimenter error, and three due to shyness), leaving a final sample of 114 children. Children were divided into two age groups: older (M ϭ 94.78 months, SD ϭ 7.54, range ϭ 72-108) and younger (M ϭ 63.14 months, SD ϭ 6.25, range ϭ 48 -72; sex, age, and condition breakdown are provided in Table 1 ). Primary data collection occurred at a science museum (140 children), with some occurring in dedicated testing labs at a large university (five children). All children were randomly assigned to an experimental or control condition.
Procedure
Children were first allocated to a green or gray group, using a minimal group paradigm. Children were asked to remove a colored token from a drawstring bag and were told that whichever color they chose would be their group for the game that day. This This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
process appeared random to the child, but in reality there was only one color option in the bag, with the color and condition assignment predetermined by a computerized randomizer. After being assigned to the group, the experimenter provided a short description of each, adapted from previous research (Oostenbroek & Over, 2015) :
You're in the green group because you picked the green coin, but there is also a gray group. The green group and the gray group are on different teams. In every competition the green group wants to beat the gray group and the gray group wants to beat the green group. The green group works together as a team to beat the gray group and the gray group works together as a team to beat the green group.
Children were then narratively checked for comprehension. If children were unable to identify their group, the information was represented. No child took more than two attempts to correctly identify the right group. Following group allocation, children were asked to answer how much they liked the ingroup and the outgroup. The experimenter stated, "Can you show me how much you like the green/gray group?" This question was presented on a child-friendly 1-5 Likert-type scale with happy to sad faces (see Figure 1 ). Scale comprehension was checked narratively for this question and all other questions, and the scale was represented if necessary. Again, no child took more than two attempts to comprehend any scale throughout the experiment.
Once allocated, children were shown a pair of videos of the ingroup and outgroup performing pro-or antisocial tasks (or a neutral control). Children were then given the opportunity to imitate the task they had witnessed. After children's first imitation trial, this process was repeated for a second, different task. As such, each child saw four videos-two pairings of an ingroup and outgroup performing a task. Video presentation order was randomized via the video presentation software, both between groups and across tasks. The prosocial and antisocial nature varied based on condition: In the experimental condition, the ingroup performed an antisocial task and the outgroup performed a prosocial task. This was compared to a control condition in which both groups tasks that were physically equivalent but were void of moral layering-that, is they were morally neutral (see Table 2 for a brief description and Appendix A for a full description). After viewing the videos, children were narratively checked for comprehension, gauging their understanding of both the tasks and the motivation behind the actions. If children did not understand the videos, they were replayed. If children were still unable to understand after a second viewing, their data were excluded (a total of 15 children with data retained required a second viewing of the videos throughout the entire experiment, and their responses did not differ on any of the outcome measures). After comprehension checks, the apparatus from the videos was placed in front of the children and they were given the opportunity to perform the previously demonstrated tasks. The experimenter stated, "Look. These are the things from the video. Now you get to have a turn with them. Can you show me what you want to do?" If children queried what to do, the experimenter simply said, "You can do anything you want. It's up to you." Each trial was considered complete once the children had finished interacting with the apparatus or had explicitly stated that they were finished or once 60 s had elapsed.
Children subsequently undertook the same process for the second set of task videos. Once children had completed imitation for the second task, they were again presented with the ingroup and outgroup liking ratings. Children were asked whether they wanted to change groups (yes-no). Finally, children were thanked for their participation and offered a reward (wrist band), and both the guardians and children were debriefed.
Stimuli
The actors in the stimuli videos were four women of Caucasian descent, ages 20 -25 years. The stimuli comprised eight videos-four for the experimental and four for the control conditions, with each child viewing four videos during the experiment (two per task). For the experimental condition, the tasks were prosocial and antisocial, whereas in the control condition, the tasks were matched but without a pro-or antisocial element. The paper task involved the actors' needing to fill a jar with paper, and they were required to choose a piece of paper to do so. The prosocial version involved tearing up paper that did not belong to anyone, whereas the antisocial task involved tearing up paper that did belong to someone. The sticker task involved agents' finding stickers that belonged to someone else. In the prosocial version, the stickers were placed where the owner could find them. In contrast, the antisocial version involved the stickers' being hidden from the owner. The neutral control condition for both tasks involved removing the ownership from each scenario; that is, neither the pieces of paper nor the stickers were identified as belonging to anyone. This allowed us to match the actions identically while varying only the motivation behind the actions (see Appendix A for the full details).
Coding
Children's imitative responses were coded dichotomously (1 ϭ imitated ingroup, 0 ϭ imitated outgroup). None of the children changed their decisions after initially engaging with the apparatuses. Children's ingroup and outgroup liking ratings were scored Figure 1 . Likert-type scale employed in the experiment. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (really do not like) to 5 (really like), and their desire to change groups was coded dichotomously (1 ϭ yes, 2 ϭ no). All data were live-coded and recorded directly into the video display software. Reliability coding was also conducted live for 20% of children tested. Reliability coding was conducted by a research assistant who was blind to the study aims and hypotheses. Due to the dichotomous nature of the variable, Cohen's was used to assess reliability. Perfect reliability was found for both the paper task ( Ͼ .999, p Ͻ .001) and the sticker task ( Ͼ .999, p Ͻ .001).
Results

Preliminary Analyses
Post hoc power analyses revealed that with the sample size (N ϭ 114) and standard alpha (.05) we achieved power .88 -.99 for the main analyses. A McNemar test revealed no significant differences between imitation for the paper task or the sticker task (p Ͼ .999). As such, data were collapsed across imitation scores with the intention of conducting a multinomial logistic regression. However, insufficient cell frequencies compromised the model validity for a multinomial analysis. Therefore, two separate binomial logistic regressions were conducted (one per task). There was no effect of sex or task presentation order on ingroup liking ratings (ps Ͼ .170) or desire to change groups (ps Ͼ .223). In addition, there was no effect of sex on imitation for either the paper task or sticker task (ps Ͼ .167). However, there was an effect of task presentation order on imitation for the sticker task (p ϭ .021) but not the paper task (p ϭ .985). As such, task presentation order was entered as a control variable in the model examining imitation in the sticker task.
Imitation
Paper task. A binomial logistic regression was run to determine the effect of age (older vs. younger) and condition (pro-or antisocial vs. neutral) on children's tendency to imitate the ingroup in the paper task. Overall, the model provided good fit for the data, with the final model significantly predicting the dependent variable over and above the intercept only model, 2 (3, N ϭ 114) ϭ 16.02, p ϭ .001. Pseudo R 2 values ranged from .083 (Cox and Snell) to .134 (Nagelkerke). Results revealed that an interaction between age and condition accounted for children's imitation choices, 2 (1, N ϭ 114) ϭ 9.81, p ϭ .002. We further examined this interaction at the each level of age (see Figure 2) . For younger children, condition did not significantly account for imitation choices, 2 (1, N ϭ 114) ϭ 1.87, p ϭ .172. For older children, condition significantly accounted for imitation choices, 2 (1, N ϭ 114) ϭ 12.15, p Ͻ .001. That is, older children who were in the control condition were .107 times more likely to imitate the ingroup than were those in the experimental condition (95% confidence interval [CI: .027, .425]; see Appendix B (Tables B1-B3) for the full results of each analysis).
Sticker task. A binomial logistic regression was run to determine the effect of age (older vs. younger) and condition (pro-or antisocial vs. neutral) on children's tendency to imitate the ingroup in the sticker task. Task presentation order was included as a control variable. Overall, the model provided good fit for the data, with the final model significantly predicting the dependent variable over and above the intercept only model, 2 (4, N ϭ 114) ϭ 21.28, p Ͻ .001. Pseudo R 2 values ranged from .170 (Cox and Snell) to .251 (Nagelkerke). Results revealed that an interaction between age and condition accounted for children's imitation choices, 2 (1, N ϭ 114) ϭ 6.60, p ϭ .010. We further examined this interaction at the each level of age (see Figure 3) . For younger children, condition did not significantly account for imitation choices, 2 (1, N ϭ 114) ϭ .020, p ϭ .888. For older children, condition significantly accounted for imitation choices, 2 (1, N ϭ 114) ϭ 10.67, p ϭ .001. That is, older children who were in the control condition were .068 times more likely to imitate the in- Sticker task The agent finds stickers that belong to no one and places them in a clear box (prosocial equivalent) or an opaque box (antisocial equivalent).
The agent finds stickers that belong to Sam and places them in a clear box "so Sam can find them later" (prosocial) or an opaque box "so Sam can't find them later" (antisocial).
Paper task
The agent needs to fill up a box with paper. The agent finds two pieces of paper that belong to no one and chooses to tear up a piece of either plain paper (prosocial) or patterned paper (antisocial).
The agent needs to fill up a box with paper. The agent finds two pieces of paper: a plain one that belongs to no one and a patterned one that belongs to Alex. The agent chooses to tear up a piece of either plain paper (prosocial) or patterned paper (antisocial).
Figure 2. Children's tendency to imitate the ingroup versus the outgroup on the paper task as a function of condition and age. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
group than were those in the experimental condition (95% CI [.014, .342]; see Appendix B (Tables B4-B6) for the full results of each analysis).
Reported Social Preferences
Ingroup liking ratings. A paired-samples t test was conducted to determine whether the ingroup preference manipulation had been successful. Results revealed that at pretest, children liked their ingroup (M ϭ 4.44, SD ϭ 1.01) significantly more than their outgroup (M ϭ 2.63, SD ϭ 1.42), t(113) ϭ 10.23, p Ͻ .001, d ϭ 1.47. A three-way mixed-design analysis of variance including age (older vs. younger), condition (pro-or antisocial vs. neutral), and time (pre-vs. poststimulus exposure) examined children's ingroup liking ratings. A Greenhouse-Geisser correction was employed, but the full degrees of freedom are reported. A Time ϫ Condition ϫ Age interaction was found, F(1, 110) ϭ 13.48, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .11. Pairwise comparisons revealed no significant pre-or posttest differences for younger children in either condition. In contrast, older children showed significantly lower posttest ingroup liking ratings when the ingroup had behaved antisocially compared to neutrally, F(1, 110) ϭ 16.11, p Ͻ .001 (see Table 3 ).
Desire to change groups. A binomial logistic regression was performed determine the effect of age (older vs. younger) and condition (pro-or antisocial vs. neutral) on the likelihood that participants would choose to change groups. Overall, the model provided good fit for the data, with the final model significantly predicting the dependent variable over and above the intercept only model, 2 (3, N ϭ 114) ϭ 31.04, p Ͻ .001. Pseudo R 2 values ranged from .240 (Cox and Snell) to .324 (Nagelkerke). Results revealed that an interaction between age and condition accounted for children's desire to change groups, 2 (1, N ϭ 114) ϭ 22.81, p Ͻ .001. We further examined this interaction at each level of age (see Table 4 ). For both younger and older children, condition significantly accounted for children's desire to change groups, 2 (1, N ϭ 114) ϭ 9.19, p ϭ .002, and 2 (1, N ϭ 114) ϭ 13.70, p Ͻ .001, respectively. That is, younger children who were in the control condition were 2.67 times more likely to choose to change groups than were children in the experimental condition (95% CI [.039, .498] ). In contrast, older children in the experimental condition were .107 times more likely to choose to change groups than were children in the control condition (95% CI [3.42, 54.43 ]; see Appendix B (Tables B7-B9 ) for the full results of each analysis).
Discussion
In this experiment, children ages 4 -5 and 7-8 years were shown video demonstrations of an antisocial ingroup and a prosocial outgroup completing a task and were subsequently provided the opportunity to complete the same task. Children were also asked about their social preferences-how much they liked the ingroup and how much they wanted to change groups. Prior to the manipulation, children showed a robust preference for the ingroup, as measured by liking ratings. As predicted, older children showed a strong prosocial preference after being exposed to the manipulation. When their ingroup behaved antisocially and an outgroup Note. Subscripts denote significant differences. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
member behaved prosocially (compared to a neutral control) they were less likely to imitate the ingroup, reported lower liking of the ingroup, and were more likely to choose to change groups, compared to when both groups performed neutral tasks. In contrast, younger children opted to imitate their ingroup and reported liking it equally, regardless of its behavior. Surprisingly, young children were also less likely to want to change groups when their ingroup behaved antisocially and the outgroup behaved prosocially, compared to when both groups were neutral. These findings speak to the importance of understanding intergroup bias in a range of social affiliative measures. Notably, past research has shown children to be discerning in their imitation preferences, choosing to imitate individuals over a majority consensus when the individual strategy is optimal (Burdett et al., 2016; Wilks et al., 2015) . However, we also saw that imitating an ingroup elicits a powerful social pull, even in very young children (e.g., Buttelmann et al., 2013; Howard et al., 2015) . Here, we provide the first evidence of (older) children's willingness to reject the ingroup as an imitation model in the context of the modeled actions causing harm. This speaks to the strong prosocial motivations that emerge in middle childhood (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; Smith et al., 2013) and highlights children's willingness to disengage with antisocial ingroups in a social learning context. This aligns with previously established age-related changes in sociomoral development: Throughout this time period, children experience major developments in their adherence to prosocial norms (Smith et al., 2013) , their capacity to consider others when making sociomoral judgments (Cooley & Killen, 2015; Killen et al., 2011) , and their own willingness to incur personal cost to rectify prosocial violations (McAuliffe et al., 2015; Robbins & Rochat, 2011) . The current findings demonstrate that, by 7 years of age, children are capable of eschewing the social pressures associated with ingroup preferences and allow prosociality to guide their social learning decisions. This research thus provides the first behavioral evidence of what is now a growing body of research demonstrating that, with age, there are increased social nuances in the interplay between morality and social judgments (Cooley & Killen, 2015; Hitti, Mulvey, Rutland, Abrams, & Killen, 2014; Killen, 2007; Killen et al., 2011) . For example, identified that by 9 -10 years children will allocate resources on need and relative advantage, rather than group bias. Placing the current findings among these later developments eludes to a potential new trajectory of judgment emerging from around 8 years and continuing into adolescence.
This also raises the question of younger children's motivations. Children's reported liking preferences and imitation appeared unaffected by antisocial ingroup behavior. Moreover, they actually opted to change groups less when the ingroup was antisocial. The desire to stay with an antisocial group appears counterintuitivewhy prefer the behavior of an antisocial group over a neutral one, regardless of outgroup behavior? Narrative comprehension checking ensured this was not an issue with interpretation-children were able to identify that the ingroup behavior was antisocial. Instead, we argue that children's desire to change groups may have been an attempt to justify their actions. That is, once they had performed the antisocial behavior demonstrated by their ingroup, they may have felt compelled to commit to their decision and thus to their social group. This is supported by research demonstrating children's capacity to experience, and desire to avoid, cognitive dissonance in decision-making (Egan, Santos, & Bloom, 2007) . The persisting high ingroup preferences in the antisocial ingroup condition (compared to control) provide further support for this idea.
Alternatively, these attitudes could reflect a desire to preserve the ingroup's reputation. That is, by preferring to stay in an antisocial ingroup, children may have been attempting to justify that the behaviors performed were not necessarily problematic. Past research has shown that young children will distort information to preserve a positive image of their ingroup when reiterating stories in which the ingroup had performed antisocial actions (Dunham et al., 2011) . Again, this is further supported by the persisting ingroup bias in the antisocial ingroup condition. This argument is premised on the idea of children's feeling responsibility for the ingroup's action. In support of this, young children have been shown to feel a responsibility for, and shared guilt from, damage to others' property caused by ingroup transgressors (Over, Vaish, & Tomasello, 2016) . Notably, this effect occurred for damage caused by ingroups more than outgroups, thus indicating the feelings were not mere concern for the victim.
Otherwise, this finding could reflect that younger children simply believed that they were adhering to a group norm that happened to be antisocial. If this is the case, it suggests that, at least at this age, children's prosocial concerns are not so apparent so as to encourage group norm violation. Additionally, although manipulation checks confirmed that children perceived the antisocial behavior as intended, it remains possible that younger children neither perceive a prosocial norm nor saw one as having been violated. Again, this may be reflective of younger children's different social expectations concerning social interactions. Finally, it could be simply that younger children do not have the capacity to grasp such complex social situations. Fully fledged theory of mind emerges only around 4Ϫ5 years of age (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001 )-perhaps the younger children were This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
limited in their ability to comprehend all motivations in this scenario and thus focused on a salient category, group preferences. Future research exploring the relationships between a priority for prosocial concern over ingroup biases and theory of mind development promise to yield important insight into these key aspects of children's sociocognitive development. Our primary focus in this research was to establish whether, while engaged in social learning, children prioritize favoring ingroup decisions or prosocial concerns, and if so, when such favoring might emerge developmentally. We provide clear answers to these questions. Missing are details on the reasons why the children we tested made the decisions they did. Asking the children to explain their choices may have yielded important insight into the motivations driving the behavior we documented. Replicating this research with the inclusion of reasoning data thus stands out as a future direction for this line of work.
Notably, in the current study all group member models were portrayed by adult Caucasian women. Past studies have successfully employed women as ingroup demonstrators (Watson-Jones, Whitehouse, & Legare, 2016; Wilks & Nielsen, 2018) . Additionally, no gender effects were identified in the current study, and ingroup liking ratings indicated that the group bias manipulations were successful. The model characteristics of age and sex are thus unlikely to have impacted our findings in any tangible way. However, some of the non-Caucasian children may have not felt the same strength of affiliation with the models as did the Caucasian children. In this context, though, that the younger children were willing to perform antisocial actions to affiliate with an arbitrary group (color) may be telling of the potential capacity for a more meaningful group (such as age, gender, or race) to influence their behavior. This warrants further investigation. A meaningful extension would be to evaluate children's responses when the in-and outgroup distinction is made deliberately salient, for example by studying an ethnically diverse sample, having the ingroupϪout-group target reflect the population of the sample. Research has also appeared ambivalent on variability in children's imitation fidelity as a product of age. Whereas some research has suggested that children are equally likely to imitate older and same-aged peers but not younger peers (Brody & Stoneman, 1981) , other research has suggested that children are more inclined to imitate older than same-aged peers, particularly in a normative context (Mcguigan & Robertson, 2015; Mcguigan & Stevenson, 2016) . Thus, it should also be acknowledged that children in the current study may have perceived the adult demonstrators as teachers and imitated them because of this, rather than because of their group status. Again, this is an avenue for future research.
It is also important to consider the context of the modeled actions. Research has begun to differentiate imitation of causally transparent from causally opaque actions, such that children appear to consider opaque actions as normative and thus show higher fidelity imitation for such actions relative to instrumental actions (Herrmann, Legare, Harris, & Whitehouse, 2013; Kapitány & Nielsen, 2015; Keupp, Behne, & Rakoczy, 2013; Nielsen, Tomaselli, & Kapitány, 2018) . Here, the actions employed were functional and causally transparent. As such, children may show a stronger pull to imitate ingroups if demonstrated actions are opaque and hence interpreted as being normative. Notably, evidence has been mixed on this because Burdett and colleagues (2016) found no preferences for imitating the group in a normative (as opposed to practical) context. However, this study measured imitation preference in a forcedchoice scenario rather than imitation fidelity. In the current context, older children may have been more inclined to imitate their ingroup even when they behaved antisocially if the actions presented were causally opaque. Future research should explore whether this developmental pattern varies as a function of the characteristics of the actions demonstrated.
Finally, calls are intensifying for developmental psychology to be more culturally inclusive (Causadias, Vitriol, & Atkin, 2018; Nielsen & Haun, 2016; Nielsen, Haun, Kärtner, & Legare, 2017) . The paradigm developed here should now be implemented in a less homogenous sample to establish the cultural specificity of our findings as well as to provide a more balanced design. Moreover, this would address the aforementioned concerns about the impact of the cultural background of the demonstrators' potentially influencing the group manipulation.
Here we identified that older (7-8 years) but not younger (4 -5 years) children were less likely to imitate an ingroup when members of this group acted in antisocial ways, and they concomitantly reported both reduced liking and increased desire to change groups in this context. In contrast, younger children showed a strong ingroup preference, regardless of behavior, such that they both imitated and liked the ingroup members irrespective of their antisocial behavior. Moreover, they actually opted to change groups less when the ingroup was antisocial, compared to neutral. This study was the first of its kind to explore the role of antisocial behavior on direct imitation in an intergroup context, shedding light on both imitation behavior and group biases. The findings speak to the trajectory of sociomoral development, demonstrating the increasing capacity with age for children to weigh multiple pieces of information. Moreover, it informs the understanding of when and why children might preference different social learning models. Imitation, as an inherently social action, is a hugely powerful tool in the human social learning repertoire. The capacity for discrimination in whom one elects as a social learning model is pivotal for young children's integration into a cooperative society. This study shows a clear distinction between ages 5 and 7 in children's capacity to make informed judgments using prosociality as a social guide.
Appendix A Video Demonstration Descriptions for the Two Tasks
Sticker Task-Experimental Condition Prosocial script. The agent stands behind a table that has an apparatus with two boxes adjacent to each other, approximately 30 cm apart. One box is transparent (Perspex), and one is opaque (wood). There are five stickers placed on the apparatus, equidistant between the boxes. The agent taps a hand on the transparent box and says, "Oh look. It's Sam's stickers. They need to be put away. I care about Sam, so I am going to put them in this container so Sam can find them later. Everyone in X group puts them in here." The agent then places the stickers in the transparent box.
Antisocial script. The agent stands behind a table that has an apparatus with two boxes adjacent to each other, approximately 30 cm apart. One box is transparent (Perspex), and one is opaque (wood). There are five stickers placed on the apparatus, equidistant between the boxes. The agent taps a hand on the opaque box and says, "Oh look. It's Sam's stickers. They need to be put away. I don't care about Sam, so I am going to put them in this container so Sam can't find them later. Everyone in X group puts them in here." The agent then places the stickers in the opaque box.
Sticker Task-Control Condition
Neutral script (prosocial equivalent). The agent stands behind a table that has an apparatus with two boxes adjacent to each other, approximately 30 cm apart. One box is transparent (Perspex), and one is opaque (wood). There are five stickers placed on the apparatus, equidistant between the boxes. The agent taps a hand on the transparent box and says, "Oh look. Here are some stickers. They need to be put away. I am going to put them in this container. Everyone in X group puts them in here." The agent then places the stickers in the transparent box.
Neutral script (antisocial equivalent). The agent stands behind a table that has an apparatus with two boxes adjacent to each other, approximately 30 cm apart. One box is transparent (Perspex), and one is opaque (wood). There are five stickers placed on the apparatus, equidistant between the boxes. The agent taps a hand on the opaque box and says, "Oh look. Here are some stickers. They need to be put away. I'm going to put them in this container. Everyone in X group puts them in here." The agent then places the stickers in the opaque box.
Paper Task-Experimental Condition
Prosocial script. The agent stands behind a table with a jar and two pieces of paper, one patterned and one plain. The agent says, "See this jar (taps the jar)-I have to fill it up with paper. That means I have to choose to tear up this piece of paper (holds up plain paper) or this piece of paper (holds up patterned paper). The plain paper doesn't belong to anyone. The patterned paper belongs to Alex. That means this paper isn't anyone's (holds up the plain paper), but this paper is Alex's (holds up the patterned paper). I care that the patterned paper belongs to Alex, so I'm going to tear up the plain paper. Everyone in the X group tears up the plain paper." The agent then tears the plain paper into four pieces and places them in the jar.
Antisocial script. The agent stands behind a table with a jar and two pieces of paper, one patterned and one plain. The agent says, "See this jar (taps the jar)-I have to fill it up with paper. That means I have to choose to tear up this piece of paper (holds up plain paper) or this piece of paper (holds up patterned paper). The plain paper doesn't belong to anyone. The patterned paper belongs to Alex. That means this paper isn't anyone's (holds up the plain paper), but this paper is Alex's (holds up the patterned paper). I don't care that the patterned paper belongs to Alex, so I'm going to tear up the patterned paper. Everyone in the X group tears up the patterned paper." The agent then tears the patterned paper into four pieces and places them in the jar.
Paper Task-Control Condition
Neutral script (prosocial equivalent). The agent stands behind a table with a jar and two pieces of paper, one patterned and one plain. "See this jar (taps the jar)-I have to fill it up with paper. That means I have to choose to tear up this piece of paper (holds up the plain paper) or this piece of paper (holds up the patterned paper). The plain paper doesn't belong to anyone. The patterned paper doesn't belong to anyone. That means this paper isn't anyone's (holds up the plain paper). And this paper isn't anyone's (holds up the patterned paper). I'm glad the plain paper isn't anyone's. I'm going to tear up the plain paper. Everyone in the X group tears up the plain paper." The agent then tears the plain paper into four pieces and places them in the jar.
(Appendices continue)
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Neutral script (antisocial equivalent). The agent stands behind a table with a jar and two pieces of paper, one patterned and one plain. "See this jar (taps the jar)-I have to fill it up with paper. That means I have to choose to tear up this piece of paper (holds up the plain paper) or this piece of paper (holds up the patterned paper). The plain paper doesn't belong to anyone. The patterned paper doesn't belong to anyone. That means this paper isn't anyone's (holds up the plain paper). And this paper isn't anyone's (holds up the patterned paper). I'm glad the patterned paper isn't anyone's. I'm going to tear up the patterned paper. Everyone in the X group tears up the patterned paper." The agent then tears the patterned paper into four pieces and places them in the jar. Note. Sig. ϭ significance; CI ϭ confidence interval.
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Sticker Task: Main Analysis
Sticker Task: Follow-Up Interaction at Each Level of Age Note. Sig. ϭ significance; CI ϭ confidence interval.
